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MIT’s Activities in Europe


File In PDF: MIT’s Activities in Europe


File In PDF: MIT’s Activities in Europe

While the case regarding the assassination attempt against KONGRA GEL Co-chair Remzi Kartal and KCK Executive Council member Zübeyir Aydar continues in Belgium, eyes are once again turned to the Turkish state’s “operation network” in Europe. Europe has been used as the Turkish state’s “area of operation” for decades. Many dissidents and revolutionaries became the target of the Turkish state.

Undoubtedly, these dirty activities have a long history. It dates back to the establishment of the Turkish state. Established under Enver Pasha who is known for his Genocides, Special Organisation (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) forms the infrastructure of today’s underground structures. The names have changed but the methods and mentality have remained the same. Oppositions were tried to be silenced and eliminated by oppression and criminal means created both at home and abroad. Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa established a symbiotic relationship with the mafia and gangs of criminals released from prisons. They carried out counter-intelligence activities and assassinations at home and abroad. This structure turned into a serial crime machine and committed one of the heaviest crimes in history with the Armenian Genocide it organised. The same form of relationship is manifested today in its most vivid form.

Following the ‘Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’, intelligence organisations with different names were established. Its final form was the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT), which was founded in 1965. The same state setup created many dark criminal apparatuses in the police-soldier-gang triangle. All of them had extensive connections with politicians, bosses, judges and prosecutors, the media as well as those from the sports and arts circles. One of the structures established was JİTEM, which was mobilized against the Kurds. Gendarmerie Intelligence and the Fight Against Terrorism, in other words, was deciphered especially with the Susurluk accident in 1996. Abdulkadir Aygan, a former member of JİTEM who took refuge in Sweden in 2003, also made important confessions about this structure. Aygan explained that he was involved in crimes such as dozens of torture sessions, extrajudicial executions, and the disappearance of corpses. Following his confessions, a mass grave was discovered in 2009.

The Susurluk accident not only revealed the state-mafia relationship of JİTEM, the relations between politicians and paramilitary groups, but also gave information about the state’s operations abroad. Abdullah Çatlı, who died in the suspicious accident attributed to JİTEM, was a state agent, counter-guerrilla, mafia boss and a member of the racist-assassin Organisation, the Nationalist Movement (Ülkücü Hareket). He was a “hero” for Turkish nationalists.

With the Ergenekon case, entering the agenda of all of Turkey, the Susurluk accident became visible once again. Thus, the “operations” of this dark structure abroad were also deciphered. Expressed as the Deep State or Turkish Gladio, Ergenekon was the subject of lawsuits as a result of the power struggle. In the power struggle between the Ergenekon with Kemalist character and the political Islamist government, the Susurluk case was also included in the Ergenekon case file. The information that leaked in 2008 showed that the agent named Abdullah Çatlı was appointed by the chief of the military coup, Kenan Evren, especially against the Armenians in France in the 1980s. According to the Susurluk report, the murders and bomb attacks began on October 22, 1983, after a contact between Abdullah Çatlı and the authorities of the time. In the 1980s, many crimes were committed on the territory of France. However, Çatlı was arrested once for drug trafficking in 1984, not for the political murders he committed in France, and was sent to Santé Prison in Paris. Çatlı, who was sent to Switzerland, suspiciously escaped from prison in 1990.

After the Susurluk accident, then Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, upon the pressures, asked for a report to be prepared by investigating the state-politics-mafia relationship. In the report prepared by the Prime Ministry Undersecretary Kutlu Savaş, it was documented that mafia and nationalist groups committed murders abroad on behalf of the state, with the knowledge of the MIT, by taking appropriations from the state treasury.

Mehmet Eymür, former Head of the Counter-Terrorism Department, acknowledged the state-mafia relationship in a lawsuit filed in Istanbul after the report, and said, “We needed it both during the Armenian-ASALA activities and for the PKK activities abroad. It is not possible for normal men to do it. We need hitmen”.

In Eymür’s statements, he admitted that MİT member Hiram Abbas and together with mafia leader Alaattin Çakıcı killed Armenians in Beirut, and that Çakıcı killed Agop Agopian, one of the founders of ASALA, on April 28, 1988, in Athens, the capital of Greece. According to Eymür’s statements, in the Organisation, there were names such as Mehmet Ağar, who also served as the Minister of Justice and Interior, Korkut Eken, Special Forces Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, and Mehmet Ali Aĝca who attempted to assassinatethe Pope Jean-Paul II in Rome on May 13, 1981.


Assassinations and assassination plans targeting the Kurdish freedom movement were introduced as a new concept in the early 1980s. Encouraging these plans of the Turkish state was the decision of the European states to criminalise as terrorist the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In 1985, Germany became the first state to declare the PKK a “Terrorist Organisation”. One year later, on February 28, 1986, then Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme was murdered while returning from the cinema with his wife on foot.

For this execution they deliberately lay the blame on the PKK. The just and legitimate struggle of the Kurdish people criminalised all over the world, on the grounds of this murder. A witch hunt was launched against the Kurds. Yet it was clear that Palme was the victim of a deep conspiracy. The Kurdish movement held responsible the Gladio and many secret services from the very beginning. When the main suspect in this case died, 34 years later, the case was closed and it was admitted that the PKK had nothing to do with Palme’s murder. Kurds are still waiting for an apology from the Swedish government for this cruel and unjust accusation.


As a result of this process, assassination squads started to be sent to Europe again from the early 1990s. İmdat Yılmaz, who immigrated to Denmark in 1978 and became the President of the Federation of Kurdish Associations in 1992, two years later was subjected to an assassination organised by the MIT in 1994. Yılmaz was attacked while leaving his home on 7 February. The attacker had emptied all the bullets in his gun into Yılmaz’s body. The Danish police, to misdirect, raided the Kurdish association and detained the Kurds. Police and Danish media claimed that there was an “internal conflict within the PKK”. Yılmaz, who survived with injuries, was also pressured by the police to say that the assassination was carried out by the PKK. Yılmaz made it clear that the assassination was the work of Turkish intelligence. The case was closed without a serious investigation. However, the Danish intelligence service PET knew the perpetrator of the attack. The attacker was Mr Sabah Ketene, who often visited the “Iraqi Turks’ Cultural Association” in Copenhagen and carried a Turkish diplomatic passport.

Nationalist Turkish journalist Emin Çölaşan states that he knew Ketene as “Hero” in his article published in Hürriyet newspaper dated 11 June 2006. While describing how his “hero” Sabah Ketene carried out the assassination in Denmark, Çölaşan drew attention to the fact that Ketene had carried out this attack as a state official. After many years, in Sözcü newspaper dated July 2, 2019, this time, under the title of “Turkmen Hero”, he was praising MİT member Sabah Ketene. While writing that he met Ketene before he died, he continues: “He was a member of the MIT and had done a lot of work, especially abroad. He was both an intelligence officer and the leader of one of the disguised hit teams.”

Cölaşan’s source, Ketene, described the assassination in Denmark as follows: “When we are given a mission in one country, we go separately and unite there. We raided the apartment where an important PKK member lived in the capital city of a Western European country. We got him trapped in front of the elevator, he took at least 10 bullets. We left thinking he was dead. But the man had seven lives. He stayed in the intensive care unit for six months and eventually recovered. We couldn’t finish him, but he won’t be the same again.”

From Çölaşan’s article, it was understood that Sabah Ketene’s crimes in Europe were much more. Ketene told Çölaşan: “We formed teams, organised and started burning their forests both on the Greek islands and on the mainland. Its beautiful forests were destroyed… Also, bombs were exploded in some touristic areas! We even detonated a few bombs in the Athens Piraeus metro…”

Ketene, who explained that he carried out a bomb attacks against the PKK in Hewlêr (Erbil), the capital of the Federal Kurdistan Region (Iraqi Kurdistan), was killed as a result of an armed action in the Federal Kurdistan Region in April 2006.

The power struggle and new partnerships during the transition from Kemalism to the era of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have revealed new paramilitary structures. Especially abroad, intelligence, kidnapping and assassination activities were intensified. Now, all structures with a “Turkish” and “Muslim” character connected to the state began to work like intelligence agencies. Mosques, imams, disciples of sects, nationalists, associations, journalists, politicians, ambassadors and more became part of this intelligence network.

The first major attack by the Erdogan government abroad took place in Paris on January 9, 2013. One of the founders of the PKK, Sakine Cansız, KNK Paris Representative Fidan Doğan and Kurdish youth movement member Leyla Şaylemez were murdered in an attack organised by the MIT. All traces of the investigation showed that the order came from Ankara.


In the following years, attacks against Kurds and all opposition voices escalated, both domestically and abroad. New paramilitary structures came into play. Now the judiciary, the police, the parliament, the media and the military came under the command of the government as a whole. The prominent new name was SADAT. SADAT, which acted as a paramilitary Organisation as an internal threat and pressure tool, was also assigned for operations abroad.

SADAT is mentioned in the assassination attempts against Kurdish prominent individuals in Belgium and politician Berivan Aslan in Austria. Adnan Tanriverdi, the head of SADAT, abbreviation for the International Defence Consulting Company, visited Paris with Erdogan in 2018, at the time of the preparation of the assassination attempt in Belgium. His name was not mentioned in the official delegation. It is not known what kind of meetings he held during this visit, what was discussed or whether any agreements were made.

The information revealed in the investigation carried out in Belgium also reveals the connections between the assassination team and SADAT. Photos of the assassination team members with Adnan Tanrıverdi are included in the file. The case in Brussels is considered extremely important for these dark structures to be deciphered and convicted before justice. These structures, which we describe as dark, also reveal the true character of the Turkish state since its establishment.

So who is this Tanriverdi and SADAT under his administration? Tanriverdi was Erdogan’s personal advisor. He is a former soldier who has served as the Chief of the General Staff Special Warfare Department and the TRNC Civil Defence Organisation for 30 years. Tanriverdi is a lecturer at The Turkish Military Academy and the current Minister of National Defence, Hulusi Akar, who became the Chief of General Staff on July 15, is one of Tanriverdi’s student.

Their relationship with Erdogan dates back to at least 1994. The relationship between them intensified after the February 28 period, and gained a new dimension after the “coup attempt” on July 15, 2016. As a matter of fact, after this date, Tanrıverdi started to work as the Chief Advisor to the President on security issues at Erdoğan’s request. He began attending security summits at the very top of the state.

As a result of reactions to his statement, “We need to prepare for the arrival of the Mahdi,” at the 3rd International Islamic Union Congress held in Istanbul in December 2019, Tanrıverdi resigned from his duties both as the Chief Advisor and also as the Security and Foreign Policy Committee Member on January 8, 2020.

SADAT, which he founded, officially was registered on February 28, 2012. At that time, there were 23 retired officers and non-commissioned officers. Today, it is stated that it has 64 advisers in 22 Muslim countries, especially in the Tripoli government. SADAT, which directly participates in the training of armed groups in Syria, can easily enter Turkish military camps. In 2016-2017 and 2018, it advised armed gang groups in the invasion operations called Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch. This force, which is used in foreign operations, is also used as an armed political militia within the country. It is claimed they have camps especially in Tokat and Konya provinces. SADAT’s real activities are kept confidential, except for some emerging information.

It is alleged that SADAT is working especially for the security of the governments of Muslim countries. SADAT, which also acts as a mediator between the governments in question and the Turkish defence industry, also provides training for the Infantry, Special Forces, Navy and Air Forces. SADAT, which is also considered as a new Turkish Gladio, manages operations inside and outside the country. In other words, it acts like a parallel structure of MIT inside the country and abroad.

As a matter of fact, the Erdogan regime has increased its threats against the dissidents in Europe with its paramilitary structures. Now, not only the Kurds, but all the active opposition voices are being targeted.

SADAT also appears in an article published in the French Le Point magazine in September 2021. The subject of the news is the assassination attempt on Berivan Aslan. The person whose opinions were sought is Feyyaz Öztürk, who was assigned for the assassination.

Although Feyyaz Öztürk, who turned out to be an MIT agent, confessed to the assassination attempt. Instead of being arrested by Austria, he was deported to Italy, where he was a citizen of. He lives on the island of Sicily. Speaking to journalist Guillaume Perrier from Le Point magazine, Öztürk said that a secret cell acting on behalf of the MIT contacted him in 2018, that they had a meeting in an association in Belgrade in August 2020, and that someone named “Uğur” talked to him and gave him the task of “chaos killing of the Vienna politician Berivan Aslan”. Öztürk also went to the Austrian intelligence service BTV in September 2020 and confessed, in detail, the task given to him by the secret Turkish cell. An investigation was launched against him for crimes such as participating in the assassination attempt and having relations with criminal Organisations, and he was suddenly released three months later.

Feyyaz Öztürk who took part in the assassination plan against the Austrian Kurdish politician Berivan Aslan.
Öztürk especially drew attention to the role of SADAT in his confessions to Le Point magazine: “After the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016, thousands of intelligence agents accused of treason were purged. To fill the void, the state relied on nationalist cells or paramilitary groups. SADAT, the private security company founded by an Islamist general, has thus become one of the main contractors in MIT’s operations abroad.”

France stands out again in Öztürk’s confessions. In the last decades, especially by the Turkish intelligence agency France has been used as an operation area. Öztürk continues “I lived in the MIT sanctuary in an apartment in Choisy, in the middle of Chinatown in France”.

Although SADAT’s increasing activities in Europe in recent years have been ignored by both European authorities and major media outlets, even partial information reflected in the media indicates that the danger is big. Indeed, speaking to the US-based Huff Post in November 2018, former NATO officer Cafer Topkaya warned that SADAT was preparing to conduct operations in Germany. Major Cafer Topkaya, who was on duty at the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Brussels, was also arrested after the coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016. Topkaya, who was released on parole after spending nearly 1.5 years in prison, fled abroad after his release.

Stating that the MIT can carry out abduction operations similar to those in Kosovo and Africa in western European countries, Topkaya said that the Erdogan government will use SADAT, an armed militia force, for this. Pointing out that Sadat was the most powerful armed group in Turkey at that time, Topkaya continued: “A friend of mine in the army told me that SADAT is attempting an operation against the dissidents in Europe. My friend is a trusted source within the military. He also stated that SADAT sends messages to its sleeping cells in Europe via Anadolu Agency (AA).


The case in Brussels is considered extremely important in order to prevent Turkish espionage networks and assassination plots, which pose a great danger.

Following the investigation into the assassination attempt in June 2017 against KONGRA GEL Co-chair Remzi Kartal and KCK Executive Council member Zübeyir Aydar, it was decided to file a lawsuit on 18 June 2021.

The first hearing was held on October 1, 2021. A total of four people are on trial in the case: Zekeriya Çelikbilek, Yakup Koç, Necati Demiroğulları and Hacı Akkulak. This last one Haci Akkulak is of Kurdish origin. Initially told that he was to collect information only he reveals the plot when he realises that the real aim is to commit assassinations.

This case is of “explosive” nature for the intelligence services of both Turkey and the Western countries it cooperates with.

Kurdish authorities want this assassination attempt, which has been deciphered, to be condemned by the judiciary. It is hoped that the case in Belgium will set a precedent for other European countries as well.

In the investigation conducted by the Belgian judicial bodies regarding the assassination attempt, in terms of the connections of the group accused of plotting the assassination striking details emerged.

Especially as a result of technical tracking, important information was obtained. Investigators determined that there was a plan to “turn into a bloodbath” in the telephone call between the two people. These statements led to the investigation being taken even more seriously.
The statements in question are made in a telephone call by Zekeriya Çelikbilek, before the vehicle with the Turkish assassination team was caught in the police control portrayed as “routine” check in Brussels in 2017. It was revealed in the investigation that there was an exploratory work and a search for material for the assassination.

According to the information in the case file, since Çelikbilek lived in France, another member of the team, Yakup Koç, nicknamed “Colonel”, went to France to join him was mobilised from there. Yakup Koç had drawn attention with an ID belonging to the Turkish police on him during the police check in Belgium. In the investigation, it was established that Koç also worked at the Turkish Embassy in Paris.

Due to the team’s epicentre being in France, the Belgian judiciary asked the French authorities to conduct an investigation within the framework of International Judicial Cooperation. The French police began to listen to the telephones of those involved in the assassination network. Only some of them were shared with the Belgian authorities. Jan Fermon, the lawyer of the Kurdish politicians, stated that they had the impression that France did not share all the information with Belgium. According to Fermon, France withholds significant information.

However, as a result of the wiretaps, it was understood that not only Çelikbilek and Koç, but also a group of people were related to one another. The chief of the team is thought to be Yakup Koç.

It was determined that all of the group acting together had connections with the Turkish Embassy in Paris. The team also has direct links to Ankara. Many members of the team have photos taken with an adviser to Erdogan at the Presidential Palace in Ankara.

The team members are known for professions such as electrician, used car salesman, etc. For example, Çelikbilek introduces himself as an electrical engineer.

But there is a different picture in the background. “Tomorrow I have to go to Belgium for the homeland,” one of them says in wiretaps. In 2017, he goes to Ghent, Belgium, and procured a car from a “Turkish businessman” Necati Demiroğulları and drive to Ankara with it. Demiroğlulları is also the brother-in-law of Yakup Koç and is responsible for all logistics of the assassination team.

Demiroğulları makes false documents for Yeşilyurt, presenting the vehicle as a “company vehicle” and Yeşilyurt as a “company employee”. Yesilyurt puts Yakup Koç into action to get these things done. Koç asks brother-in-law Demiroğulları to take care of the job. For this purpose, Yeşilyurt’s passport and other necessary documents are requested. In the investigation, copies of the passport and other documents are found on Demiroğulları’s WhatsApp account. Thus, the Belgian judiciary decides to further deepen the investigation into Yeşilyurt.

Yeşilyurt, registered to the Trabzon province registry office, died on April 8, 2021, at the age of 41, due to “Covid-19”. His body was sent to his hometown. During the investigation, it was determined that İrfan Yeşilyurt had sent a parcel to Istanbul with Chronopost before he died. Yeşilyurt called Chronopost and asked why his package did not reach his address and got angry. When Chronopost asked what was in the package, İrfan Yeşilyurt replied that he had a list of names and telephone numbers. The French police, that questioned Yesilyurt, asked what he had sent to Istanbul. Yesilyurt claimed to have a list of names and telephone numbers. When the police asked what kind of name list it was, they received an inconsistent response. Yeşilyurt argued that he went to the cemeteries in France, wrote down the names of the Turks buried there and sent them to Ankara. The fact that the French police were content with this answer also raised questions. It was surprising that the dead had telephone numbers.

There is another remarkable development regarding Yeşilyurt. Belgian investigators realised that Yeşilyurt was detected by a secret warning system in the Schengen area. In other words, every time the Yeşilyurt border crosses, it is forwarded to the relevant units. This means that the French were following Yeşilyurt. According to Fermon, Yesilyurt was strangely removed from the Schengen warning system and its traces were erased when Belgian authorities began to ask questions.

Another name identified in this network is Sami Koç. He is Yakup Koç’s nephew. There is another person called “Avni”. When the French police track them down, they realise that they have received special training, as this group is using a technique to prevent wiretaps. In other words, they knew how to prevent wiretapping.

In the investigation, it is understood that the epicentre of the assassination team sent to Belgium is France.

The photographs of the subjects of the investigation with İsmail Hakkı Musa, the Turkish Ambassador to France at the time, reveal the team’s connections. Çelikbilek and İsmail Hakkı Musa are standing side by side in one of the photo frames. In the investigation file carried out in Belgium, there are clues that the “actions of this network of spies and assassinations were coordinated by İsmail Hakkı Musa” in Europe. Musa, the former number two of the MIT, as the suspicions on him grew stronger, returned to his country on 14 March 2021, announcing that his term at the embassy had expired. Musa was the number two name of the MIT at the time of the murder of three Kurdish female revolutionaries in Paris in January 2013.

While some photos were shared on social networks, some were taken from Çelikbilek’s mobile phone. During the interrogation, Çelikbilek claims that one of the photographs was sent by Yeşilyurt.

Yeşilyurt is standing between two people in the photo. When Çelikbilek is asked who they are, he says that one of them is from the family, one is Yeşilyurt, and the third is not known to him. However, one of the people he claims he does not know is Adnan Tanriverdi who is the founder of SADAT that is abbreviation of the International Defence Consulting Company. This person was also the personal adviser to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Tanriverdi also drew attention, especially when visiting Paris with Erdogan in 2018. His name was not mentioned in the official delegation. The team has photos taken with Tanrıverdi both in Ankara and in Paris.


It was revealed at the investigation that the team, that was based in Paris and disguised as electrician or second-hand car salesman, was tasked with meeting Tanrıverdi and Seyit Sertçelik, the adviser to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Seyit Sertçelik was one of the names Erdoğan affiliated with during his visit to Paris. He is the Chief Advisor to President Erdoğan and a member of the Presidential Security Policy and Foreign Policy Board. Prof. Dr. Seyit Sertçelik appears to be mainly busy with denying the Armenian Genocide.

He is photographed visiting a Turkish prison in the Afrin, a city in Rojava, which was occupied by the Turkish state in March 2018. He also shared this photo on his Facebook page. However, his other photos, which were not made public, show that Sertçelik went much further. For example, he has photos taken in both Paris and in the Presidential Palace in Ankara, with the network of hitmen in Europe.

Two photographs of Sertçelik in particular draw attention. One with Çelikbilek in Paris, the other with Keskin and Koç in Ankara. Zekeriya Çelikbilek took the photograph in Ankara. These three people visited Sertçelik at his office located in Erdogan’s Palace in Ankara.

Çelikbilek’s phone also contains a piece of paper and photographs containing the name of a military attaché at the Paris Embassy. The military attaché, whose name cannot be learned, describes everything he has done for the AKP in this paper. When the French police asked Çelikbilek what it meant, he said that the military attaché was accused of being affiliated with the Fethullah Gülen Community and was asked to give mentioned paper to Erdoğan if he was to get apprehended.

When Çelikbilek and the military attaché met at the embassy in Paris after the coup attempt in 2016, such written request was sent to him. If Çelikbilek is only an “electrician” as he claims, the question of why the military attaché delivered this message to Çelikbilek so that it can be conveyed to Erdoğan arises. In brief, the military attaché knew that Çelikbilek had direct ties with Ankara.

The file before the court in Belgium consists of 7,000 pages. Zübeyir Aydar, who was the target of the assassination attempt, said, “The existence of a criminal network is very clearly revealed in this file. The assassination plans have been exposed in all clarity, and it is clearly in the file that this is directly in association with the MIT, the Turkish government and even Tayyip Erdogan.”

The prosecutor, who is dealing with the file, argues that there was no assassination attempt and that it could be an intelligence activity. Lawyer Jan Fermon said, “The facts in the file indicates something completely different. It was clear to me that there was an assassination attempt. The prosecutor’s comment is quite surprising,” he says.

Many questions regarding those people who have connections with the summit of the Turkish state are waiting answers. While Turkey does not contribute in any way to the investigation, insufficient information sharing by France raises suspicions. No investigation was initiated against group member Yakup Koç, Turkey and no investigation was done in that country.

France did not initiate any investigations against team members who spied on its territory and attempted assassination in Belgium. On the contrary, some of the team members still continue to live in France with complete impunity. In particular, when he was asked about Zekeriya Çelik during the interrogation, İrfan Yeşilyurt allegedly responded as “Why are you asking me, he is working for you”.

What kind of a connection does the French services have with the assassination team, why do they not share all the information with the Belgian authorities, did SADAT’s chief meet with the French services when he visited Paris in 2018, and if so, what was discussed? Why was İrfan Yeşilyurt detected by the Schengen warning system, why was he suddenly removed? Most importantly this time, will the real culprits behind the assassination attempt be revealed in a European court, and will Ankara, in other words, the “head” be touched?

It was revealed during the investigation that Turkish intelligence services were involved in the murder of three Kurdish women revolutionaries in Paris on January 9, 2013, but the French authorities did not act bravely and chose to hide it.

Whether there is a direct link between the assassination attempt in Belgium and the executions in Paris has not been “legally” proven, but there are serious doubts that these were “politically” directed from the same centre. In this respect, these two incidents cannot be considered in isolation.

So what happened in Paris, how did it end? One of the founders of the PKK, Sakine Cansız (Sara), KNK Paris Representative Fidan Doğan (Rojbîn), and the member of Kurdish Youth Movement Leyla Şaylemez (Ronahi) were murdered on January 9, 2013, in the heart of Paris with three bullets each.

Immediately after the massacre, an investigation was launched and all arrows were directed at the Turkish intelligence service MIT. Documents revealed in 2014 showed that the order for the massacre was given in Ankara. There was the signature of MIT officials in the instruction classified as confidential dated November 18, 2012. In the instruction, it was revealed that “an operational plan neutralize Sakine Cansız” was prepared by Ömer Güney.

In an audio recording leaked on the internet on January 12, 2014, it was understood that Ömer Güney made assassination plans together with MIT personnel. Killer Ömer Güney had also asked the MIT for help while making an escape plan in 2014 in a prison in Paris.

Ömer Güney, who was arrested on 17 January 2013 and who was terminally ill for a long time died in prison on 17 December 2016, in other words, about a month before the trial was to began. The trial was scheduled to begin in December but was delayed to January 23, 2017 for undisclosed reasons. And the French judiciary closed the case on the grounds that the murder suspect has died.

However, an important development in Southern Kurdistan contributed to the reopening of the file. Two senior MİT officials who planned to assassinate PKK officials were caught in a special operation organised by the guerrilla on August 4, 2017 in Southern Kurdistan.

Erhan Pekçetin, who is responsible for overseas operations, and Aydın Günel, who is responsible for human resources, confirmed the confidential document and audio recording in their confession and gave the names of the MİT officials who took part in the talks.

Among the planners of the Paris Massacre was Sebahattin Asal, who was Deputy Undersecretary of Strategic Intelligence in 2018 and Vice President of Ethnic Separatist Activities in 2013. This person had taken part as the right-hand man of Hakan Fidan, the chief of the MIT, during the negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish state.

All information point directly to Ankara. While there was a blockage in the judiciary-police-politician triangle in Paris in revealing those who gave the order, the assassination attempt that emerged in Belgium mobilised the Kurds in Paris too.

The families of three Kurdish revolutionary women led to the launch of a new investigation in Paris. However, politicians and police services, in other words, the state, stand in the way of enlightening the massacre in all its aspects. Despite all the calls and reactions, the French government and intelligence services refuse to release the information they have. Kurdish Organisations in France are reacting to the fact that State’s secrets “are becoming obstacles and prevents revealing the truth”. This also ensures that a terrorist crime committed by the Turkish secret services on French soil goes unpunished.

Undoubtedly, the assassinations and assassination attempts of the Turkish state are not limited to France and Belgium. The Turkish state, which has an extensive espionage network in almost every country in Europe, uses different methods to intimidate its dissidents. Methods such as threats, physical attacks, assassinations, detentions and arrests when entering Turkey, Interpol and kidnapping are used.


Germany is among the EU countries where the Turkish spy network is most active. People of Turkey are gaining importance as the largest foreign population living in Germany. However, Turkish-German relations are based on the agreement between Emperor Guillaume II and Abdul Hamid II dating back to 1888. The Prussian general Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, also known as Goltz Pasha, was tasked with reorganizing the Ottoman army and training future Young Turk cadres.

Having a dark and dirty relationship from the Armenian Genocide to German Nazism, both countries later signed an agreement in October 1961 to encourage Turkish workers to work in the Federal Republic. There was a wave of immigration. Thus, Turkish nationalism and paramilitary structures began to take root in Germany. From the Turkish racist Alparslan Türkeş to the architect of the 1980 coup, Kenan Evren, from the Prime Minister of the 1990s Tansu Çiller to today’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, Germany, which is at the centre of the relationship network of Turkish fascist leaders; In the last century, Germany has become the “backyard” of Turkish nationalism and intelligence.

The Nazi ideology and the idea of “Turanism” fed each other at all times. As a matter of fact, during the Second World War, Türkeş established close ties with the Nazis, and this “friendship” continued after the war. Relations between the two countries did not fail even during the military coups. In short, today’s cooperation and complicity is rooted in history. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that Ömer Güney, who murdered three Kurdish revolutionary women in Paris in 2013, came from Bavaria in particular.

The role of Ruhi Semen, Ömer Güney’s collaborator in Germany, is still not fully clarified. Güney, who came to Germany on the grounds of marriage in 2003 and settled in the town of Bad Tölz in the State of Bavaria, has been in contact with Semen the most since then. Semen, who was a foreman at a factory called “Kinshofer GmbH”, where Güney worked until 2009, was the person who provided recruits to the Turkish state establishments in Germany and even organised Turkish nationalist groups in Bavaria for a long time.

In the last days of January 2013, after Ömer Güney’s identity was revealed, colleagues of Güney and Semen at the factory where they worked spoke to ANF, they drew attention to the close relationship between the two, but the French and German authorities never opened an investigation against Semen. Moreover, Semen was recorded as the only person who visited Güney when he was in prison.

Despite the fact that he was found to be acting as a courier for the MIT when meeting with Güney on January 4, 2014 in the prison in Paris, Ruhi Semen was not questioned by the Germany’s police or judicial departments, and he fled to Turkey. According to the research conducted by ANF in January 2021, Semen returned to Germany years later and continued his activities in the Religious Affairs Turkish-Islamic Union (DITIB), which works like a branch of MIT.

Semen has been an active name in the mosque and association of DITIB in Miesbach for many years. Both towns where Ömer Güney lives in Bavaria belong to Bad Tölz and Schliersee Miesbach. In a photograph obtained by ANF, Semen was seen with a manager of DITIB at a charity bazaar organised by DITIB in the summer of 2013. The close and warm pose of the duo was obvious. It turned out that Semen was still active in DITIB after returning from Turkey in the summer of 2020. It is noteworthy that the German security units, who felt the need not to open an investigation or follow up on Güney, turned a blind eye to his collaborator Ruhi Semen this time.


There were also assassination attempts by the Turkish state against Kurds in Germany. One of the names deciphered recently was M. Fatih Sayan. The German judiciary would take one of its scandalous verdicts in 2017 for this name. Announcing its decision on MIT agent Mehmet Fatih Sayan who was found to be gathered information about Kurdish politicians in Europe and planning an assassination on 10 October 2017, the Hamburg court gave a sentence like a reward. Stating that Sayan is “not a professional”, the court decided that he should be released from prison on bail with the condition of 2-year “judicial control”.

Sayan, after his secret agent identity was revealed, applied for asylum at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Hamburg on 12 December 2016. Sayan, who stated in his first statement that he was in the assassination team put up together by the MIT against Kurdish politicians, was hurriedly taken into custody. Sayan, who later changed his first statement, turned the historical court building in Hamburg into a theatre, so to speak.

Sayan, who dismissed almost all of the accusations as coincidences in his private life, wanted to acquit the MIT and blame the police close to the Gülen Movement, the former partner of the AKP. At the end of the hearings, the court stated that the sentence of 2 years and 6 imprisonment demanded by the prosecutor’s office was too much and decreed to release Sayan on the condition of a 2-year ‘judicial control’.

Contrary to the court, the prosecutor’s office announced that Sayan had been working for Turkish intelligence since 2013 and received 30,000 Euros for it. However, despite of all the information and dozens of documents, Sayan’s file took its place in the archives as one of the MIT files that Germany covered up in 2017.

Even the trial of Sayan is considered a “small miracle” considering the relations between Germany and Turkey. Because, despite numerous threats, assassination attempts and exposed espionage activities, impunity has become the main policy.

Three people who were tried in relation to an espionage cell of the Turkish intelligence in May 2015 were released on bail in return for 70,000 Euros. Among them was Muhammed Taha Gergerlioğlu, a senior MIT official and Erdogan’s adviser. Two other people, Ahmet Y. and Göksel G, were their employees. These agents were tasked with spying on Kurdish and Alevi dissidents living in Germany and sending the information they gathered to the MIT. Gergerlioğlu was detained at Frankfurt Airport on 17 December 2014. The names and addresses of hundreds of Kurds were recorded in a notebook that the police seized on Gergerlioğlu. Similarly, hundreds of names and dozens of passport copies were found on his phone. His release came after a meeting between Erdogan and then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on October 19, 2015. The mystery of the notebook he carried and the activities he carried out were hidden away.

Although the evidence proved many times that DITIB works like an intelligence agency for the Erdogan regime, the investigation against DITIB was terminated in 2018. The federal prosecutor’s office, which made no headway in the year-long investigation, opened an investigation against only 19 DITIB officers on the grounds that they were working for the MIT. However, this file did not go any further and was closed.

Undoubtedly, when we go back further, we encounter the same policy of impunity in assassinations. In 1980, socialist trade unionist Celalettin Kesim was murdered by the MİT in the Kreuzberg district of Berlin with the help of Turkish racists and religious fanatics. However, the German investigation authorities did not choose to follow the footsteps of Ankara, which had a hand in this business.

In 1986, the MIT kidnapped 4 members of the Turkish leftist Organisation Dev Sol from Stuttgart to Ankara and convicted them. The four people in question had claimed asylum in Germany. Responding to the Left Party (Die Linke), which submitted a parliamentary motion on the subject, the government claimed that it was not aware of the kidnapping.

On December 31, 1994, TKP ML-TİKKO members Nurettin Topuz, Mustafa Akgün and Mustafa Aksakal were killed by the bullets of a MHP fascist in a coffee shop they visited in the town of Germersheim that is within the borders of the Rhineland Palatinate State. It came to light years later that the murderer, whose identity was concealed for a long time and was released by the court after being detained, had served in the “anti-terror” unit of the police department of Yozgat province before 1980.

On September 3, 1995, a Kurdish youth Seyfettin Kalan lost his life as a result of the attack by a group of Turkish fascists in the city of Neumünster. In the same days, the racist paramilitary Organisation “Ülkücüler”, being encouraged by the silence of the police, launched a wave of attacks and lynching campaign against the Kurds across Germany. Places belonging to Kurds in Ulm, Bielefeld and Mülheim were set fire to. The murderer, a member of the “Ülkücü” group, who murdered Seyfettin Kalan and injured two young people, was charged for carrying a gun without permission only and was released after a while.

Historian-author Nick Brauns, on the espionage network and paramilitary structures in Germany, quoted the following information in an article in the newspaper Yeni Özgür Politika on December 19, 2017: “Today, it is estimated that the MIT (in Germany) agent network consists of approximately 6,000 recruits. MIT’s agents and informants are actively working in mosques, Turkish associations, as well as Turkish banks and travel agencies. In this way, they can access the travel and account details of the dissidents. In addition, according to the opinion of the German judicial authorities, MİT is also trying to be effective with paramilitary Organisations such as Osmanen Germania. Osmanen Germania was created with the aim of intimidating, threatening, suppression and even attacking the regime opponents.”

The Turkish state also has front companies that carry out espionage activities in Germany and target dissidents. The Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD), which was established by the AKP government on April 1, 2016, is just one of them. The German police were convinced of this after a telephone conversation between UETD’s Rhein-Neckar region head Yılmaz Ilkay Arin and Mehmet Bağcı, the leader of the “Osmanen Germania” gang.

Arin, who is also the founding president of the European Turkish Sports Union (ATSB), another Organisation established by the AKP to recruit the youth in Germany, was the most trusted man of AKP MP Metin Külünk. Külünk, on the other hand, draws attention as a close friend of retired Brigadier General Adnan Tanrıverdi, one of Erdoğan’s advisers. These structures, which are directly connected to each other, planned an attack against German comedian Jan Böhmermann in 2017, and the comedian was taken under police protection due to the threat.

In August 2015, on the German-Swiss border, police found three Czech-made “Scorpion” machine guns in a small transport vehicle they stopped. The police later determined that the recipient of this cargo was the “Osmanen Germania” gang. One of the reasons for the raids carried out against this gang in November 2016 ordered by the Darmstadt Prosecutor’s Office was these weapons.

Shortly, until it was deciphered, AKP member Külünk had frequent visits to European countries, especially Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, and held meetings in mosques, associations and unofficial AKP’s NGOs. It was revealed that the “Osmanen Germania” gang, which was involved in many crimes in Germany, was also working under Metin Külünk.


It turned out that the Turkish state also created an execution list in Europe, which included the names of dozens of people. The list, which was revealed in the press in mid-2021, included the names of journalists and activists. Lists containing the names of the people to be executed in many European countries have emerged. It was confirmed by the German police in July 2021 that there was an execution list of 55 people in Germany.

Journalist Erk Acarer, who was living in Berlin at the time the lists were released, was attacked with a knife at his home on July 6, 2021. Acarer said one of the attackers threatened “you won’t write”. Three people carried out the attack. While one was on guard, the other two attacked. There is an arrest warrant for him in Turkey. He has been living in Germany since 2017.

After this attack, an account called “Jitemkurt” shared that there is an execution list about 21 opposition journalists, artists, intellectuals and writers living in Europe and that they will be killed. Following a question in parliament, Ministry of Interior in Germany announced that they were “examining” this list which included the names such as Kurdish artist Ferhat Tunç and politician Hasip Kaplan, journalist Celal Inception, lawyer Mahmut Şakar, former Diyarbakır Mayor Osman Baydemir and Kurdish artist Şivan Perwer.

Gökhan Yavuzel, a member of the International Writers Union (PEN), who was mentioned on the execution list, announced in a post on July 26 that he was attacked by four people in Wales, where he lived, and that the attackers spoke Turkish and insulted him.

Journalist Can Dündar living in exile in Germany is also on the list. Dündar has been threatened many times directly by the Turkish President. While Can Dündar was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Cumhuriyet between 2015 and 2016, he published images of weapons shipments from Ankara to the jihadists in Syria. Images were from 2014. A lawsuit was filed against him and he was sentenced to 27.5 years in prison in December 2020. In particular, he was accused of espionage. He was directly threatened by Erdogan. He was subjected to an armed attack in front of the court before the verdict of the case he was tried in Istanbul in May 2016, but luckily escaped. Currently, he continues to broadcast on the internet platform called “Özgürüz”. Can Dündar remains to be the target of the Turkish government.


In addition to these lists, the Turkish state also puts “awards” on the heads of many dissidents, while making execution plans, on the other hand, it encourages ordinary people to murder. In Belgium, names such as Zübeyir Aydar and Bahar Kimyongür are on this red list. The Turkish Ministry of Interior has prepared “red”, “blue”, “green”, “orange” and “grey” lists for this purpose. The reward promised in the red list reaches up to 10 million TL. In a news report of the Turkish newspaper Sabah on March 9, 2012, it was announced that the “Anti-Terrorism Award Regulation” was issued in order to apprehend PKK leaders. A reward of 4 Million Turkish Liras was promised for anyone who caught any of the 50 people whose names were on the list. It was stated in the same list that 20 of these Kurds, who were mentioned as the “leading cadre”, lived in Europe.


In addition to assassination attempts and execution lists, threatening messages are sent to many people, including European politicians. Sevim Dağdelen, a left-wing parliamentarian in Germany, is not on the wanted list, but she lives under police protection due to threats. This is also true for Berivan Aslan in Austria.

An investigation was launched in November 2020 after threatening messages in Turkish against the Flemish Justice Minister Zuhal Demir in Belgium. Demir was subjected to police stakeout at her home. It is stated that the threatening messages were sent in response to the statements of Minister of Justice Zuhal Demir regarding the mosques in Belgium affiliated to Diyanet, which are considered as the “extension” of the Erdogan regime. According to the prosecutor’s office, the person who sent the e-mail in Turkish threatened Demir, saying that he “knows where she lives, that he will rape her, that he knows where to find her if she does not keep quiet.”

With the complicity of many countries, the Turkish intelligence agency abducted many people and took them to Turkey in recent years. Most of these people belong to the Gülen Community, a former accomplice of the Erdogan regime. In this context, Selahattin Gülen, the nephew of the leader of the community, Fethullah Gülen, mysteriously disappeared in Kenya at the beginning of May 2021. On May 31, Turkish authorities announced that they had Gülen. The Ankara regime says they have captured dozens of people in this way since 2016. In 2018, 6 people affiliated with the Gülen community were detained by the MIT in Kosovo. The Turkish state is putting pressure on many countries in the Balkans, Central Asia and Africa within this framework.

In September 2020, Kurdish asylum seeker İsa Özer was kidnapped in Ukraine and taken to Turkey. It was not clarified as to how this “operation” took place.


The information contained in this file constitutes a very small part of the dark activities organised and activated by the Turkish state in many parts of the world. Since its establishment, the Turkish state has committed serious crimes against humanity both at home and abroad. Western governments, teaching human rights and democracy lessons at every opportunity, either encouraged the alliance in the face of Turkey’s crimes or did not go beyond a verbal condemnation. Even though it is known that the Turkish state has intense relations with structures such as ISIS, which are considered as enemies of humanity, European governments continue to play the three wise monkeys. On the one hand, the expanding network of espionage and the threat of attack, on the other hand, its undeniable ties with structures such as ISIS against all human values pose a serious threat to the freedoms and democracy around the world, especially the Kurds and the peoples of the Middle East.

File In PDF: MIT’s Activities in Europe

The Research Committee of the Kurdistan National Congress

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